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The Importance of Legitimacy
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Abstract
Within organizations, there are typically limits to leaders’ legitimacy. This paper
explores how organizations are structured in the face of such constraints. The con-
cept of legitimacy is formalized in the context of a single-agent moral hazard model.
The principal can give the agent monetary incentives; in addition, he can give the
agent an order. The agent finds it costly to disobey orders provided they are legiti-
mate. We find that it may be optimal for the principal to take costly actions to bolster
legitimacy. We argue that many organizational phenomena can be understood as at-
tempts to bolster legitimacy. Examples include: rejection of overqualified workers,
bureaucracy, merger decisions, and above-market-clearing wages.
∗Akerlof: University of Warwick. email: r.akerlof@warwick.ac.uk. I am grateful to George Akerlof,
Kaushik Basu, Bob Gibbons, Oliver Hart, Rachel Kranton, and seminar participants at MIT and the World
Bank ABCDE conference for helpful comments.
1 Introduction
It is widely recognized outside of economics that rules are easier to enforce when they
are considered legitimate. There are three reasons that are commonly cited. First, when
agents see rules as legitimate, they feel a sense of duty to obey them. Second, agents are
motivated to punish violators of rules they consider legitimate (for instance, by report-
ing them to authorities). Finally, attempts to enforce illegitimate rules tend to provoke
anger and resistance. This suggests that legitimacy is important and the need for it
might serve as a constraint on the way in which organizations are structured. This pa-
per builds a simple model to explore the implications of such constraints. It highlights a
number of organizational features that may be explained by them, including: rejection
of overqualified workers, bureaucracy, and above-market-clearing wages.
We formalize the concept of legitimacy by introducing it into a single-agent moral-
hazard model. A principal can use variable wages to incentivize an agent to exert effort.
He also has a second tool: he can give the agent an order. The agent finds it costly to
disobey legitimate orders but it is costless to disobey illegitimate orders. Orders are only
legitimate if they are not too tough: specifically, if the order (θ) is less than or equal to L,
where L parameterizes the extent of the principal’s legitimacy. We refer to the condition
θ ≤ L as the “authority maintenance constraint.”
Initially, we take legitimacy L as exogenous. When legitimacy is high, it is optimal to
use orders to incentivize the agent. When legitimacy is low, it is better to use monetary
– i.e., high-powered – incentives. We then examine the case where the principal can
bolster legitimacy at a cost. The principal may find that cost worth incurring since this
allows him to give the agent tougher orders. Specifically, we find it is optimal to bolster
authority when legitimacy is in an intermediate range.
We will argue that a number of phenomena can be understood as attempts by orga-
nizations to bolster authority. To give just one example, firms’ hiring decisions are often
influenced by legitimacy considerations since workers may be more or less respectful of
authority. Bewley (1999) suggests that firms tend to reject “overqualified workers” for
this reason. In interviews he conducts with personnel managers, they point to disobe-
dience as the key reason for rejecting overqualified workers. One tells him: “Overqual-
ification is a problem, just as is underqualification. You cannot fulfill the needs of an
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overqualified person. They will be unhappy and will be a problem.” 1
While legitimacy has received relatively little attention in economics, several recent
papers stress its importance and seek microfoundations (in particular, see Basu (2015),
Akerlof (2015), and Be´nabou and Tirole (2011)). Chen (2013), looking at a dataset of
World War I deserters, also provides empirical support that legitimacy matters for rule
enforcement. Legitimacy is highly stressed outside of economics: by legal scholars, po-
litical scientists, and sociologists, among others (see, for instance, Blau (1964), Korn-
hauser (1984), Ostrom (1990), Tyler (1990), and Fagan and Meares (2008)). For instance,
Blau argues that in the absence of legitimacy, rules will be disobeyed because ”coer-
cive use of power engenders resistance.”2 Ostrom (1990) suggests that ”the legitimacy
of rules...will reduce the costs of monitoring, and [its] absence will increase [the] costs.3
Fagan and Meares point out that the illegitimacy of the police in inner cities is a key rea-
son why it is difficult to root out gang activity. This article contributes to the literature on
legitimacy by suggesting that it serves as a constraint on the way in which organizations
can be structured.4
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 discusses a
range of organizational phenomena related to the model. Section 4 concludes. Proofs
of formal results are contained in the Appendix.
2 A Simple Model
2.1 Statement of the Problem
Consider a setting with a risk-neutral principal and a risk-neutral agent. The principal’s
payoff is given by pi = a1−w, where a1 is an effort choice of the agent and w is the wage
1Bewley (1999), p. 284.
2Blau (1964), p.199-200.
3Ostrom (1990), p. 204.
4While there is relatively little work in economics on legitimacy per se, a number of papers suggest
reasons why leaders would take costly actions to increase authority over followers. For instance, costly
actions sometimes help a leader persuade followers to obey (see Hermalin (1998), Majumdar and Mukand
(2004), and Van den Steen (2009)). Bolton et al. (2013) argue that resoluteness can help a leader coordinate
followers. Efficiency wage models also suggest that it may be worthwhile to pay above-market-wages in
order to put in place effective punishments for disobedience (see, for instance, Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)).
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paid to the agent. The principal only observes an imperfect measure of a1: q ∈ {h, l}.
The probability q = h depends upon a1 and upon a second effort choice of the agent, a2.
Specifically, Pr(q = h) = a1 + λa2. One can think of a2 as effort to make q erroneously
look good. λ ≥ 0 parameterizes the quality of q as a measure of a1, where a higher value
of λ corresponds to a worse measure.
One tool available to the principal to incentivize the agent is the wage, which can be
made a function of q: w(q). The principal also has a second tool. He can give an order to
the agent (θ) regarding the level of a1 he would like.
The agent can participate or not. If he does not participate, he has an outside option
that yields 0. If he does participate, the agent’s payoff is given by: U = w − 1
2
(a21 + a
2
2)−
1a1 6=θ · D(θ). U is increasing in the wage (w) and decreasing in effort (a1 and a2). The
agent also suffers a loss D(θ) if he disobeys the principal’s order.
We assume it is only costly to disobey orders that are ”legitimate.” The principal’s
order is only legitimate if θ ≤ L (that is, if it is not too severe). L parameterizes the
extent of the principal’s legitimacy. Specifically, D(θ) =
{
∞, θ ≤ L
0, θ > L
. We will refer
to the condition θ ≤ L as the authority maintenance constraint – or AM constraint. If
the AM constraint is satisfied, we will say the principal ”maintains authority”; if it is
violated, we will say the principal ”eschews the use of authority.”
2.2 Solution to the Principal’s Problem
First-best. It serves as a useful benchmark to consider what would happen if effort
were contractible (i.e., the first-best case). It is easy to show that the first-best levels of
effort are: aFB1 = 1 and aFB2 = 0. aFB1 > 0 since effort of type 1 is productive; on the
other hand, aFB2 = 0 since effort of type 2 has no productive value (it simply distorts the
measure q).
Second-best. Now, let us turn to the principal’s actual problem (i.e., the second-best
case). The principal’s problem is to choose a wage w(q) and order θ so as to maximize
his expected payoff E(pi). He maximizes subject to a participation constraint (PC) and
an incentive compatibility constraint (IC). The participation constraint can be written as
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follows:
E(U) = [w(l) + (a1 + λa2)(w(h)− w(l))]− 1
2
a21 −
1
2
a2
2 − 1a1 6=θ ·D(θ) ≥ 0 (PC)
The incentive compatibility constraint the principal faces depends upon whether he
maintains authority (satisfies the AM constraint) or not. If he satisfies AM, he faces
the following IC constraint:
a1 = θ, a2 = λ(w(h)− w(l)) (IC – AM)
The IC constraint if he violates AM is:
a1 = w(h)− w(l), a2 = λ(w(h)− w(l)) (IC – no AM)
Notice that, if the principal eschews the use of authority (violates AM), he can obtain
productive effort (a1) by paying a variable wage (w(h) > w(l)) – or put, differently, by
using ”high-powered incentives.” The problem with variable wages, though, is that they
incentivize the agent to exert unproductive effort (a2) as well as productive effort. On
the other hand, if the principal maintains authority (satisfies AM), he can use orders (θ)
rather than a variable wage to incentivize the agent. Orders have the advantage that
they do not incentivize unproductive effort (a2).
The principal therefore faces a tradeoff. He can meet the AM constraint, in which
case he faces a better IC constraint; or, he can violate AM and face a worse IC constraint.
Clearly, when AM is a more restrictive constraint – legitimacy (L) is lower – the prin-
cipal’s inclination to violate AM will be greater. This is the intuition that lies behind
Proposition 1 (stated below). It shows that authority is maintained when L is high and
eschewed when L is low.
Proposition 1. The solution to the principal’s problem depends upon whether his legitimacy (L)
is low, medium, or high.
1. High legitimacy (L ≥ 1): The principal orders the first-best (θ = 1); incentives are
low-powered (w(h)− w(l) = 0); and effort is first-best (a1 = 1, a2 = 0).
2. Medium legitimacy (1 > L ≥ 1− λ√
1+λ2
): The principal gives the maximum legitimate
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order (θ = L); incentives are low-powered (w(h)−w(l) = 0); and effort is a1 = L, a2 = 0.
3. Low legitimacy (L < 1− λ√
1+λ2
): The principal eschews the use of authority; incentives
are high-powered (w(h)− w(l) = 1
1+λ2
); and effort is a1 = 11+λ2 , a2 =
λ
1+λ2
.
If the principal has sufficient legitimacy (L ≥ 1), he can achieve the first-best out-
come, using authority rather than variable wages to incentivize the agent. Notice that,
when L > 1, the AM constraint is actually non-binding (the principal has more authority
than he needs). If the principal has an intermediate level of legitimacy, it is worth using
authority rather than variable wages to incentivize the agent, but it is no longer possible
to achieve the first-best. The AM constraint is binding in this case: or, put differently,
the principal sets the maximum legitimate order (θ = L). When legitimacy is sufficiently
low (L < 1 − λ√
1+λ2
), it is no longer worth maintaining authority (the AM constraint is
violated). The principal uses high-powered incentives rather than authority to obtain ef-
fort. Consequently, the agent exerts both productive effort (a1) and unproductive effort
(a2).
2.3 Bolstering Authority
Now, suppose the principal can bolster his authority over the agent at a cost. Specifically,
assume his legitimacy is given by L = L0 + b, where b denotes the principal’s effort to
bolster his authority. The cost to the principal of bolstering is b
2
2
. Proposition 2, stated
below, characterizes the solution to the principal’s problem in this case.
Proposition 2. It is optimal for the principal to bolster authority if and only if he has an inter-
mediate level of legitimacy:
1. High legitimacy (L0 ≥ 1): the principal does not bolster authority (b = 0), gives the
first-best order (θ = 1), and incentives are low-powered (w(h)− w(l) = 0).
2. Medium legitimacy (1−
√
2λ2
1+λ2
≤ L0 < 1): the principal bolsters authority (b = 1−L02 ),
gives the maximum legitimate order (θ = L = 1+L0
2
), and incentives are low-powered
(w(h)− w(l) = 0).
3. Low legitimacy (L0 < 1 −
√
2λ2
1+λ2
): the principal does not bolster authority (b = 0),
eschews the use of authority, and incentives are high-powered (w(h)− w(l) = 1
1+λ2
).
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We find that it is optimal for the principal to bolster his authority – choose b > 0
– when he has an intermediate amount of legitimacy. When he has high legitimacy
(L0 ≥ 1), it is not worth bolstering because he can achieve the first-best without doing
so. When he has low legitimacy (L0 < 1 −
√
2λ2
1+λ2
), it is not optimal to bolster because
he eschews the use of authority. He uses high-powered incentives rather than authority
to obtain effort. But, when the principal has an intermediate amount of legitimacy, it is
optimal to bolster because authority is worth maintaining and, by bolstering, the prin-
cipal is able to give a tougher order to the agent. Put another way, bolstering is valuable
because it loosens the AM constraint.
3 Applications
We will now discuss a range of real-world settings that correspond to the model. In
particular, we will argue that a number of phenomena can be understood as attempts
by organizations to bolster authority.
Who receives orders?
Firms’ hiring decisions may be influenced by legitimacy considerations. Imagine, for
example, a firm is deciding between hiring worker A and worker B. Worker A is more
skilled/productive; but worker B is more respectful of authority (the firm has legitimacy
LB > LA if it hires B). Hiring worker B is therefore a way in which the firm can bolster
its authority. The model suggests that it may be optimal to hire B even though worker
A is more skilled.
We mentioned in the introduction, for example, firms’ disinclination to hire “overqual-
ified workers.” This disinclination has been documented by Bewley (1999) who finds
that personnel managers are as wary of overqualification as they are of underqualifica-
tion. While one could imagine other reasons for such wariness, such as adverse selec-
tion, Bewley’s interviews suggest that the main concern is, in fact, lack of respect for
authority.
Who gives orders?
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Just as respect for authority may vary with the choice of worker, it may also vary with
the choice of manager. Hence, legitimacy considerations come into play in the selection
of managers – and, relatedly, the extent to which authority is delegated within firms.
Imagine, for instance, a firm has a choice between having manager A give orders to
workers and delegating authority to manager B. Suppose it is costly to delegate to B –
for instance, because B’s preferences are not aligned with the firm’s – but manager B has
more legitimacy (LB > LA). The model suggests authority might be delegated despite
the cost since doing so bolsters the firm’s authority. Alternatively, there might be benefits
associated with delegation: for instance, manager B might have better information than
manager A. When there are benefits to delegation, it can nonetheless be optimal for A to
retain authority if A has greater legitimacy (LA > LB).
The sociologist Alvin Gouldner’s study of the General Gypsum Company, entitled
Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy, provides an example. Gouldner was initially puzzled
by the degree of bureaucracy within the firm; but he came to understand that it served
a purpose. The General Gypsum Company had a serious problem at their Oscar Center
Plant where there were “few rules...and fewer still that were strictly enforced.”5 To deal
with this problem, they initially tried installing a new plant manager, Vincent Peele; but,
while Peele was well motivated, he lacked legitimacy, and consequently, his attempts to
make reforms failed. When he tried to enforce a rule against absenteeism, for instance,
workers were angered and retaliated by increasing their absences. Supervisors at the
plant concluded the “rule just could not be enforced.”6 The company eventually worked
out a better arrangement. They realized that if, rather than delegating to Peele, the
central office set the rules, they would be perceived as more legitimate. Thus, while
the resulting organizational form was costly – highly centralized and bureaucratic – it
helped the firm bolster its authority over workers.
Multiple Agents
Suppose a principal wants to incentivize multiple agents rather than just one. What
it takes to be seen as legitimate by one agent (A) might be different from what it takes to
be seen as legitimate by another (B). For instance, legitimacy over A might be given by
5Gouldner (1954), p. 51.
6Ibid., p. 142.
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LA = L0 + b while legitimacy over B might be given by LB = L0 − b. In such a setting,
it may be optimal to eschew authority over one agent so as to bolster authority over the
other.
Such considerations are highly relevant for mergers. When firms have different cul-
tures, merging them may pose a problem of authority maintenance. It may be better
for such firms to have a market relationship instead (akin, in the model, to eschewing
authority over one agent and using high-powered incentives).
Buono et al. (1985) describe a case where these issues are at play. They examine a
1981 merger of two mutual savings banks. While the banks were in many ways similar,
different cultures prevailed. In particular, the leadership style in Bank A was somewhat
democratic and participative while the leadership style in Bank B was more authoritar-
ian. Both banks took pride in their cultures and, in each bank, the style of leadership
prior to the merger was viewed favorably by employees. Following the merger, the
CEO of Bank B played the key role in managing the merged entity (the other CEO be-
came COO). According to Buono et al., the merger was not a success: primarily because
there was anger in Bank A post-merger and resistance to the Bank B CEO’s authoritarian
leadership style.
Wage-setting
Legitimacy considerations are also relevant for wage-setting: since the level of pay
within a firm – as well as pay dispersion – may impact upon legitimacy. Suppose,
for instance, a firm’s legitimacy is increasing in the expected wage it pays its work-
ers (L = L0 + f(E(w))). It can be optimal to pay an above-market wage – that is, a wage
that makes the participation constraint non-binding – since doing so bolsters authority.
The model therefore suggests a reason for efficiency wages. Observe that the rationale
for paying efficiency wages is distinct from other models, such as Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984).
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4 Conclusion
This paper has argued that limited legitimacy of authority plays a significant role in
determining organizational behavior and organizational structure. We formalized the
concept of legitimacy in a single-agent moral hazard model. The model explains numer-
ous organizational phenomena such as: rejection of overqualified workers, bureaucratic
organization, merger decisions, and above-market-clearing wages.
The paper suggests a number of avenues for future research. We briefly mention
three. First, there is a burgeoning literature on ”persistent performance differences”
(PPDs) across firms. To what extent might authority/legitimacy differences across firms
explain PPDs – and, more widely, productivity differences across regions and countries?
Heterogeneity in management practices are an important source of PPDs (see Bloom et
al. (2013)). It has often been thought that heterogeneity in management practices is
due to heterogeneity in managerial skill; but the model suggests they might also be
accounted for by heterogeneity in legitimacy.
Second, the paper considers an environment where decreases in legitimacy reduce
welfare. But, in some contexts, low legitimacy might be beneficial. For instance, it might
prevent abuse of authority or allow for better information aggregation.7
Finally, the model in this paper is reduced form – since its goal is simply to show
that legitimacy considerations matter – but there is a need for micro-foundations of le-
gitimacy and for a deeper understanding of how orders come to be seen as more/less
legitimate. Several papers mentioned in the introduction make a start towards this goal.
5 Appendix (For Online Publication)
Proof of Proposition 1. Let us consider the maximum profits the principal can obtain if he
violates AM and the maximum profits he can obtain if he meets AM and compare.
If the principal violates AM, he maximizes E(pi) subject to (PC) and (IC – no AM). It
is easily shown that it is optimal to choose: w(h) = 1
2(1+λ2)
and w(l) = − 1
2(1+λ2)
(which
implies w(h)− w(l) = 1
1+λ2
). The resulting payoff to the principal is E(pi) = 1
2(1+λ2)
.
7See Landier et al. (2009) for one approach to this topic.
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If the principal meets AM, he maximizes pi subject to (PC) and (IC – AM). It is easily
shown that it is optimal to choose: θ = min(1, L) and w(h) = w(l) = 1
2
(min(1, L))2. The
resulting payoff to the principal is E(pi) = min(1, L)− 1
2
(min(1, L))2.
Observe that if L ≥ 1, the principal’s profits from meeting AM are 1
2
≥ 1
2(1+λ2)
, so
it is optimal to maintain authority in this region. Now suppose L < 1. His profits are
higher from meeting AM than not if and only if L− 1
2
L2 ≥ 1
2(1+λ2)
. It is easily shown this
constraint is equivalent to: L ≥ 1− λ√
1+λ2
. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2. Again, let us consider the maximum profits the principal can ob-
tain if he violates AM and the maximum profits he can obtain if he meets AM and com-
pare.
Suppose AM is violated. From the proof of Proposition 1 we know that the maximum
payoff that can be obtained for a given value of b is 1
2(1+λ2)
− b2
2
. Clearly, it is optimal to
set b = 0, which results in a payoff of 1
2(1+λ2)
.
Now suppose AM is not violated. From the proof of Proposition 1 we know that
the maximum payoff that can be obtained for a given value of b is θ = min(1, L) and
w(h) = w(l) = 1
2
(min(1, L))2, where L = L0 + b. It is easily shown that it is optimal to set
b = 0 when L0 ≥ 0 and set b = 1−L02 when L0 < 1. The resulting payoff to the principal
is 1
2
when L0 ≥ 1 and (1+L02 )− 12(1+L02 )2 − 12(1−L02 )2 when L0 < 1.
Profits are higher from meeting AM than violating AM when L0 ≥ 1: since 12 ≥
1
2(1+λ2)
. Now suppose L0 < 1. The principal’s profits are higher from meeting AM than
not if and only if (1+L0
2
)− 1
2
(1+L0
2
)2− 1
2
(1−L0
2
)2 ≥ 1
2(1+λ2)
. It is easily shown this constraint
is equivalent to: L0 ≥ 1−
√
2λ2
1+λ2
. This completes the proof.
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